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I. Introduction 
 
The rapid growth of the biotechnology industry over the past two decades led many countries to 
recognize the vast economic potential of their genetic resources and indigenous knowledge.1  
Pharmaceutical companies and plant breeders increasingly rely upon these resources to engineer plant-
derived drugs, disease-resistant crops, and biotechnical production processes.2  With increasing demand 
for new biotechnological products, the global community is struggling to strike a balance between the 
interests of host countries, who seek remuneration for supplying genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge, and biotechnological inventors, who are pressing for free access, open markets, and stronger 
intellectual property rights protection. 
The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed the advent of conflicting and often 
uncoordinated treaty regimes that sought to address the regulation of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge.3  These treaties reflected the increasingly polarized views of the international community 
                                                 
1 Ajay Sharma, The Global Loss of Biodiversity: A Perspective in the Context of the Controversy over Intellectual 
Property Rights, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 4 (1995). 
2 Kerry ten Kate & Sarah A. Laird, Bioprospecting Agreements and Benefit Sharing with Local Communities, in 
POOR PEOPLE’S KNOWLEDGE, PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 133, 134 (J. 
Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds. 2004) (“Annual global markets for products in the healthcare, agriculture, 
horticulture, and biotechnology sectors derived from genetic resources lie between U.S. $500 billion and U.S. $800 
billion . . . in the case of healthcare, there are still sales of between US$75billion and US$150 billion of 
pharmaceuticals and between U.S. $20 million and U.S. $40 billion worth of botanical medicines derived from 
genetic resources each year.”).   
3 Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47, 60 (2001) (“The advent of modern 
biotechnology has already generated various concerns in the transnational sphere that the global community is 
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towards intellectual property rights.  Industrialized countries, seeking to maintain incentives for new 
innovations through a strong intellectual property rights regime,4 viewed many developing countries’ 
wishes to assert sovereign control over their resources as barriers to free trade.5  The United States, for 
example, resisted treaty regimes that appeared to emphasize technology transfer and benefits-sharing over 
strengthened intellectual property rights.6  In contrast, many developing countries viewed intellectual 
property rights as a tool for industrialized countries and multinational corporations to gain free access to 
their resources without sharing in the benefits derived from these resources.7  Consequently, developing 
countries began to assert their sovereign right to control the resources within their territorial jurisdictions.8  
Due to these deep-rooted disagreements, new strategies for regulating the raw materials needed 
for biotechnology are necessary to promote a global exchange of genetic resources on fair and equitable 
terms.  These strategies include: (1) increased use of material transfer agreements between suppliers and 
users of genetic resources; (2) unilateral amendments to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) with a view 
towards integration; (3) proposed national legislative reforms; and, (4) the establishment of a fund or 
financial mechanism to aid developing countries in the requisite capacity-building to develop local 
biotechnological capabilities.  
This Note analyzes divergent views on the proper role of intellectual property rights and 
international treaty regimes in the biotechnology trade, and surveys proposals for providing an equitable 
means for developing countries to share in the wealth derived from genetic resources.  The discussion will 
                                                                                                                                                             
struggling to address through disparate and largely uncoordinated treaty regimes. Although some success has been 
achieved, the rapid development of biotechnology applications will place increasing stress on traditional regulatory 
regimes.”). 
 
4 See, e.g., Sharma, supra note 1, at 15-17 (explaining the industrialized countries’ support of strengthened 
intellectual property rights to protect “incentives for scientific innovation” and investment in the developing world).    
5 See, e.g., id. at 19-20. 
6 See, e.g., Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between International Intellectual Property and Environmental 
Protection: Biodiversity and Biotechnology, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 255, 262-63 (1998) (explaining the United States’ 
opposition to Article 16 of the Convention on Biological Diversity).   
7 W. LESSER, SUSTAINABLE USE OF GENETIC RESOURCES UNDER THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 4 
(1998). 
8 See, e.g., Sharma, supra note 1, at 13-14.  
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begin with a general background on trade in genetic resources, biotechnology, and the increasingly 
important role of intellectual property rights on the inputs and outputs of the biotech industry.  In Section 
III, this Note will address the sources of conflict between developed and developing countries over the 
imposition of intellectual property rights regimes on their resources.  Sections IV and V will discuss the 
CBD and the TRIPS Agreement respectively, highlighting their objectives and approaches to 
biotechnology trade.  Finally, this Note will discuss various strategies for facilitating the sharing of 
benefits between buyers and sellers of genetic resources.   
 
II: Bio-Prospecting, Biotechnology, and the Influence of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
The exchange of biological materials and the concomitant disputes arising from these exchanges 
are not unknown to history.  For millennia, civilizations have engaged in extensive trading of genetic 
materials such as food crops.9  Biological resources were traditionally treated as community property to 
be dispersed with at will or, alternatively, as personal property that could be freely exchanged.10  Free 
exchange of these biological materials was the norm and took place with little government involvement.11 
Moreover, the use of these resources usually took place without compensation to the sovereign power 
from which these resources originated.12  The “common heritage approach” continued into the modern 
era, enabling many multinational corporations from industrialized countries to accumulate vast gene and 
seed banks, 13 often without compensating the original supplier of these materials.  Since the 1980s, the 
common heritage approach to biological resources has progressively unraveled as a new system of 
property rights emerged.14 
                                                 
9 See generally LESSER supra note 7, at 14-21 (detailing the historical background to the trade in biological 
materials).  See also Implementing the Convention on Biodiversity: Genetic Resources, GRZ Website, 
http://www2.gtz.de/biodiv/english/genres.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).   
10 See generally LESSER supra note 7, at 18. 
11 Id. at 19. 
12 Id. at 181-82. 
13 See, e.g., David Downes, New Diplomacy for the Biodiversity Trade: Biodiversity, Biotechnology, and Intellectual 
Property in the Convention on Biological Diversity, 4 TOURO J. TRANSNT’L L. 1, 8-14 (1993).   
14 Id. at 19-21 (describing the treatment of ex situ genetic resources and the rejection of the common heritage 
approach).    
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Significant developments in biotechnology transformed the global community’s conception of 
natural resources in the 1980s.  Plant-derived pharmaceuticals, genetically modified crops, and other 
products derived from genetic materials fueled demand for biodiverse genetic resources.15  Consequently, 
these developments led to a resurgence in biodiversity prospecting activities.16   Biodiversity prospecting 
(“bio-prospecting”), which refers to the search and collection of biological materials to be used for 
commercial purposes,17 places a premium on the natural resources of countries rich in biological 
diversity.  In recent years, annual global markets for biologically-derived products in healthcare, 
agriculture, horticulture, and other biotechnology sectors averaged between $500 billion and $800 
billion.18  The sheer size of these markets is testament to the increased interplay between biological 
resources and economic trade that took place during the 1980s and 1990s.   
The elevated demand for biological resources during the 1980s and 1990s marked a transitional 
period during which global perceptions of the value of these resources evolved.  Biological materials, 
once treated as a common resource for humankind, began to be viewed as a form of property.19  
Pharmaceutical companies, which had invested substantial sums into bio-prospecting and research, sought 
intellectual property protections for biological processes that were traditionally not afforded protection.20  
In 1986, the first U.S. patent for a genetically engineered variety of corn was granted.21  The transition 
from a common resource conception to one of intellectual property rights is attributed to the rising 
economic value of these resources due in part to the growing demands of biotechnology industries.22  As 
                                                 
15 See Implementing the Convention on Biodiversity: Genetic Resources, GRZ Website, 
http://www2.gtz.de/biodiv/english/genres.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).   
16 WALT REID et al., A New Lease on Life, 6-7, 12-18, in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC RESOURCES 
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (W. Reid et al., eds., 1993). 
17 DARRELL A. POSEY & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TOWARD TRADITIONAL 
RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 227 (1996).   
18 Kate, supra note 2, at 134.   
19 See, e.g., VANDANA SHIVA, PROTECT OR PLUNDER? UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 44-45 
(2001).   
20 KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 222 (2000) (noting that the first 
U.S. patent for a genetically engineered microorganism was finally granted after a U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
1980.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)). 
21 Carlos Scott Lopez, Intellectual Property Reform for Genetically Modified Crops: A Legal Imperative, 20 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 367, 370 (2004).   
22 LESSER supra note 7 at 19-20 (“[P]roperty rights are typically created in response to rises in value.”). 
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genetic materials shifted away from being viewed as a common resource and toward becoming a form of 
property, the stage was set for intellectual property rights to be applied to biologically-derived products 
produced in the biotechnology industry. 
  Biotechnology placed substantial stress on traditional views of property rights that did not 
recognize intellectual property in life forms.  As patents were applied to new biological processes and 
products, many of these viewpoints gave way to increasing acceptance in the United States and 
elsewhere.  The United States now recognizes patent eligibility in practically every life form, save for 
cloned humans.23  The European Union recognizes patent protection for micro-biotechnological 
inventions, processes, and microorganisms, while several upper-income developing countries, such as 
Singapore and South Korea, recognize patents for biological inventions.24 In these countries, intellectual 
property rights provide important economic protection for the blossoming biotechnology industry, which 
enjoys hefty returns on their investments.   
The recognition of intellectual property protection served a variety of essential functions in the 
evolution of the biotechnological industry.  First, intellectual property rights were perceived as a means to 
stem the tide of lost revenue due to piracy.25  Second, intellectual property rights sought to provide 
incentives for scientific research.26  Despite these beneficial functions, many countries and industries 
lacking technological resources voice skepticism about intellectual property rights when applied on a 
global scale.27  Indeed, the perception among many developing countries is that strong intellectual 
property protection only benefits the exporters of biotechnological products.28   
 
III: The Controversy over Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources, and Traditional Knowledge 
 
                                                 
23 MASKUS, supra note 20, at 223.   
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 58.  
26 Sharma, supra note 1, at 16-17.   
27 Victoria E. Spier, Finder’s Keepers: The Dispute Between Developed and Developing Countries over Ownership 
of Property Rights in Genetic Materials, 7 WIDENER. L. SYMP. J. 203, 211-12 (2001).   
28 Id. 
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 The increasing application of intellectual property rights toward genetic resources fanned the 
flames of a global controversy.   Among scholarly and political circles, the appropriate role of intellectual 
property rights in the global biotechnology industry is a popular subject of discourse.  Some argue that the 
application of intellectual property rights mechanisms to genetically engineered life forms and other 
products of biotechnology constitute a form of “colonialism” over the natural resources of developing 
countries.29  Others posit that strong intellectual property rights generate larger returns for creative 
activity, create incentives for additional invention, and expand investment in developing countries.30  The 
most accurate assessment of the efficacy of intellectual property rights in biotechnology lies somewhere 
between these views.   
 Throughout the legal systems of the industrialized world, intellectual property rights are the 
primary means of protecting inventors’ interests.31  Serious concerns arise when applying these systems to 
countries where the primary source of economic wealth consists of indigenous knowledge and genetic 
materials.  These assets seldom qualify for patent or copyright protection, but are nevertheless essential to 
the invention of new biotechnological products.  Not surprisingly, a growing consensus believes that 
conventional intellectual property rights are woefully inadequate.  
 The conflict over intellectual property rights is partially the result of an unequal distribution in the 
location and wealth of the world’s global biodiversity.32  As a general rule, the richness in biodiverse 
natural resources is inversely related to latitude.33  Thus, the majority of the world’s biological wealth is 
concentrated in the temperate regions of the globe.34  Estimates indicate that nearly eighty percent of the 
                                                 
29 VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE  4-5 (1997).   
30 See, e.g., MASKUS, supra note 20, at 6-7 (discussing the potential consequences and benefits of applying 
intellectual property rights protections on a global scale). 
31 Chidi Oguamanam, Localizing Intellectual Property in the Globalization Epoch: The Integration of Indigenous 
Knowledge, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 135, 135-36 (2004).   
32 Biodiversity is an umbrella term for the degree of nature’s variability among organisms and ecological complexes.  
See, e.g., Sharma, supra note 1, at 1.  Article II of the Convention on Biological Diversity defines biodiversity as 
“the variability among living organisms . . . and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes 
diversity within species, between species, and of ecosystems.”  United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 
June 5,1992, S. TREATY DOC. 20 (1993), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818. 
33 Ashish Kothari, Beyond the Biodiversity Convention: A View From India in BIODIPLOMACY: GENETIC RESOURCES 
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 67-72, (V. Sanchez & C. Juma, eds., 1994).   
34 Id.    
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raw genetic inputs used in biotechnology are from tropical developing countries.35  Exacerbating the 
effects of this uneven distribution of biological wealth are uneven distributions of scientific knowledge, 
technology, and buying power.  Countries with abundant genetic wealth are substantially underdeveloped 
compared to the genome-poor industrialized countries, which possess the majority of the world’s 
technological knowledge.36  
 The uneven distribution of the earth’s biological resources, coupled with the superior technology, 
economic leverage, and scientific knowledge of developed countries, has resulted in serious inequities in 
the global biotechnology trade.  For example, nearly one-fourth of all prescription pharmaceuticals sold in 
the United States contain active ingredients extracted or derived from plants, the sales of which amounted 
to $15.5 billion in 1990 alone.37  Globally, over one hundred prescription drugs are made from plants, 
seventy-four percent of which come from knowledge derived from the oral traditions of indigenous 
communities. 38  Unfortunately, most countries supplying these genetic resources and indigenous 
knowledge have not profited from the exploitation of their resources.39  One report from the United 
Nations estimated that losses to developing countries as a result of the utilization of genetic materials 
without compensation approach $5.4 billion per year.40  These losses have translated to profits for many 
industries in industrialized countries.  For example, statistics show that the market for the American 
soybean crop has seen an annual increase of $3 billion over the past 60 years, largely the result of 
biotechnology.41   
 One of the more dramatic examples illustrating the disparities in benefits received globally as a 
result of biotechnology is the famous case of the rosy periwinkle, a plant native to Madagascar.  
                                                 
35 Joseph Straus, Biodiversity and Intellectual Property, CASRIP PUBLICATION SERIES: RETHINKING INT’L 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 142 (2000) available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Number6/Straus.pdf (last visited September 14, 2005). 
36 See generally Jim Chen, Diversity and Deadlock: Transcending Conventional Wisdom on the Relationship 
between Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property, CASRIP PUBLICATION SERIES: RETHINKING INT’L 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 171 (2000), available at 
https://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Number6/Chen.pdf (last visited September 14, 2005). 
37 McManis, supra note 6, at 273-74. 
38 Id. 
39 See, e.g., Straus, supra note 36, at n.12. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at n.13. 
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According to Charles R. McManis, Eli Lilly, the U.S. pharmaceutical company, developed two cancer-
fighting alkaloids in the 1960s that derived its active ingredients from the rosy periwinkle.42  Eli Lilly 
obtained patents on the materials it developed and marketed the alkaloids as a drug.  By the time the 
patents had run out, Eli Lilly reportedly earned several hundred million dollars without providing any 
compensation to impoverished Madagascar.43  Although the rosy periwinkle represents an extreme 
example of the biotechnology trade gone awry, it highlights the inequities that can result between host 
countries and biotechnological industries.  This example also provides insight into the contentious issues 
of patent law and other intellectual property rights as applied to the global biotechnology trade. 
 Traditional intellectual property rights have proven quite difficult to apply to the raw genetic 
resources and indigenous knowledge found in developing countries.44  The incompatibility of traditional 
intellectual property rights with the inputs of biotechnology can be illustrated through patents.  Patents 
enable patent holders to prohibit the use or production of a product by non-patent holders.45  Although 
patents and other intellectual property rights mechanisms are creatures of national legislation and may 
vary from country to country,46 the eligibility of an item for patentability typically depends on three 
criteria.  The three criteria for determining patent eligibility require the invention to: (1) be novel or 
previously unknown; (2) contain an inventive step that is non-obvious to one skilled in the area of 
technology it represents; and, (3) be useful or have industrial application.47  It should be noted, however, 
that mere discoveries of a use are not patentable under traditional intellectual property regimes.48  
 Given the criteria of (1) novelty (2) inventive step, and (3) industrial applicability, most of the 
wealth possessed by the developing world is not eligible for patent protection.49  For example, the bulk of 
                                                 
42 McManis, supra note 6, at 273-74. 
43 Id.  
44
See LESSER, supra note 7, at 182 (“Traditional IPR mechanisms by which products or outputs of biotechnology are 
protected indicates they are seldom applicable to inputs.”). 
45 Id. at 21. 
46 Id. 
47 MASKUS, supra note 20, at 39.   
48 LESSER, supra note 7, at 23. 
49 Id.  
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all genetic resources lack known uses,50 while the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples, including 
knowledge about the medicinal qualities of particular genetic resources, is likewise ineligible for patent 
protection.51  Since most developing countries possess an abundance of patent-ineligible material and lack 
the technological capabilities found in industrialized countries, it is not surprising that these countries 
hold a disproportionately small number of the world’s patents and enjoy substantially little of the wealth 
derived from patented products.52   
 Given that a large amount of the natural resources and indigenous knowledge that went into the 
development of biotechnological products originated from developing countries, many of these countries 
voiced disillusionment with the lack of remuneration from the developed world.53  Several countries 
expressed the view that intellectual property rights protect only innovations and not the biological 
germplasm that these countries possessed in abundance.54 Indeed, many host countries view patents of 
biotechnological products as an impediment to their economic and technological development.55  The 
controversy over intellectual property rights, genetic resources, and remuneration became a major issue in 
the negotiation and eventual outcome of the CBD. 
 
IV: The Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
The CBD represents a global framework aimed at protecting biodiversity.  Although this 
agreement is largely an international treaty aimed at promoting the sustainable use of environmental 
resources, it also possesses important economic aspects that impact the application of intellectual property 
                                                 
50 Id. 
51 Daniel Wüger, Bioprospecting Agreements and Benefit Sharing with Local Communities, in POOR PEOPLE’S 
KNOWLEDGE, PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 183, 192 (J. Michael Finger & 
Philip Schuler eds., 2004). 
52 Id.  See also, MASKUS, supra note 20, at 174-75 (illustrating that patent holders in developing countries are 
overwhelmingly foreign.  In Mexico, for example, of the total number of patent applications filed in 1996, 30,000 
were filed by foreign residents, while only 389 were from domestic residents).   
53 See, e.g., Spier, supra note 27, at 211-12.   
54 Sharma, supra note 1, at 16. 
55 Spier, supra note 27, at 211-12. 
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rights on the inputs of the biotechnological industry.56  The following discussion on the CBD highlights 
the implications of this agreement on biotechnology and intellectual property rights.   
The CBD approaches conservation based on the theory that what is perceived as having economic 
value tends to be used more efficiently, thus promoting the sustainable use of depletable resources.57  
Consequently, the CBD seeks to conserve resources through economic incentives and other market 
mechanisms.  Article I sets forth the three objectives of the CBD: (1) the conservation of biodiversity; (2) 
the sustainable use of its components; and, (3) the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits that arise out 
of utilizing genetic resources.58  Article I goes on to indicate that “equitable sharing of benefits” includes 
access to genetic resources and “the appropriate transfer of relevant technologies . . .”59  As indicated in 
Article I, the sharing of benefits arising out of utilization of genetic resources is a central objective of the 
CBD.  This necessarily entails the transfer and trading of biotechnological products, many of which may 
be patented or protected by other mechanisms under intellectual property law.   
Articles 15 through 21 of the CBD establish the necessary components for “fair and equitable” 
sharing of benefits arising out of utilizing genetic resources.  Most controversial among these articles are 
Articles 15 and 16.  Article 15 recognizes the sovereign rights of countries to control access to their 
resources and further stipulates that parties to the CBD shall “facilitate access to genetic resources for 
environmentally sound uses.”60  Moreover, this provision stipulates that member countries obtaining 
resources from other members do so on “mutually agreed terms” after obtaining the “prior informed 
consent” of the host country.61  Article 15 also suggests that the buyers of genetic resources facilitate the 
sharing of the benefits gained from these genetic resources.62   
Article 16 creates an obligation to provide for and facilitate the transfer of technologies relevant 
to sustainable use of biodiversity and genetic resources.  This provision is the most explicit section of the 
                                                 
56 LESSER, supra note 7, at 4-5. 
57 Id. 
58 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 32.   
59 Id. 
60 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 32, art. 1. 
61 Id. 
62 Sharma, supra note 1, at 20-21. 
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CBD in regards to the interface between the protection of genetic resources and intellectual property 
rights.63  Taken together, Articles 15 and 16 form the crux of the controversy between the developed and 
developing worlds and therefore merit further attention.   
Article 16 outlines what constitutes appropriate access to and transfer of technology between 
member states.  Article16(2) provides that “access to and transfer of technology . . . to developing 
countries shall be provided and/or facilitated under fair and most favourable terms, including on 
concessional and preferential terms where mutually agreed . . .”.64  This section also indicates that the 
transfer of technology shall be “consistent with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual 
property rights,” but conditions this statement by stipulating that access to and transfer of the benefits 
derived by biotechnology are necessary to meet the goals of the CBD.65  Article 16(3) grants host 
countries, especially developing countries, access to technology that makes use of their biological 
resources, 66 including biotechnology that may be patented.  Controversially, Article 16(5) acknowledges 
the importance of intellectual property rights but seems to give priority to the transfer of technology.67 
International response to the CBD was often dominated by the divergent perspectives voiced by 
developed and developing countries.  The United States initially refused to sign the CBD during the 
negotiations, stating that the CBD’s treatment of intellectual property rights and technology transfer was 
unsatisfactory.68  The first Bush administration argued that the CBD contained language that could 
potentially force the transfer of technology abroad while relieving developing countries of the burden to 
provide patent protection to U.S. biotechnology corporations.69  The Administration argued that Article 
                                                 
63 McManis, supra note 6, at 261.   
64 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 32, art. 16. 
65 See, e.g., Sharma, supra note 1, at 22. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 22-23; see also Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 33, art. 16(5).  Article 16(5) provides:  
“The Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other intellectual property rights may have 
an influence on the implementation of  this Convention, shall cooperate in this regard subject to  
national legislation and international law in order to ensure that such rights are supportive of and do 
not run counter to its objectives.”   
68 Michael D. Coughlin, Jr., Using the Merck-InBio Agreement to Clarify the Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 337, 344-47 (1993) (describing the United States’ response to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity in the early 1990s).   
69 Id. 
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16 treated intellectual property rights as a constraint to technology transfer rather than a prerequisite.70  
Moreover, the Administration expressed concern that the CBD would hurt the competitiveness of the U.S. 
biotechnology firms by allowing developing countries to copy U.S. inventions.  Other industrialized 
countries shared similar concerns, favoring strong international protection of intellectual property rights 
in order to create incentives for technological development.71  In addition, these countries feared that the 
CBD, by reaffirming the sovereign rights of countries to control access to their biological wealth, gave 
developing countries the power to entirely exclude access to vital biodiverse resources.72 
Interestingly, many U.S. biotech companies once opposed to signing the CBD softened their 
position, fearing that a refusal to sign could lead to their exclusion from lucrative bio-prospecting 
opportunities.73  Partially as a result of this change in position, the Clinton Administration eventually 
signed the CBD, but conditioned final ratification on an “interpretative statement” that would spell out the 
concerns of protecting intellectual property rights.  Ever since, efforts to ratify the CBD disappeared from 
the U.S. legislative agenda.74 
The developing countries, by contrast, generally opposed strong intellectual property rights 
protection and asserted their sovereign rights to control access to their genetic resources.75  Many 
countries argued that strong intellectual property protection hindered technological development by 
granting firms of industrialized countries monopoly power that enabled them to out-compete developing 
countries in their own markets.76  Others pointed to perceived injustices resulting from the imposition of 
intellectual property rights on biotechnological products, such as the royalty payments many developing 
countries paid on biotech products developed from their own raw materials.77  Malaysia and India in 
                                                 
70 Chen, supra note 36, at 206-07. 
71 Coughlin, supra note 68, at 344-47. 
72 Sharma, supra note 1, at 19-20. 
73 McManis, supra note 6, at 256-57. 
74 Id. 
75 See, e.g., Coughlin, supra note 68, at 344-47. 
76 Id. 
77 Sharma, supra note 1, at 16. 
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particular urged an interpretation of Article 16 that would justify exceptions to intellectual property 
protection if such exceptions were “in the interest” of preserving biodiversity.78 
The concerns of developed and developing countries resulted in various concessions that are 
reflected throughout the text of the CBD.  In Article 16, for example, the CBD consistently acknowledges 
the importance of intellectual property rights and stipulates that these rights be honored.79  Nevertheless, 
Article 16 places conditions on adherence to intellectual property rights by requiring mandatory 
technology transfer and benefits-sharing obligations when necessary to meet the goals of the CBD.  The 
end result was an international agreement that arguably fell short of meeting the expectations of both 
developed and developing countries because of its compromised and often ambiguous language.80   
Despite the shortcomings of the CBD, the agreement marked a crucial starting point for 
addressing the concerns of intellectual property rights and the trade of biotechnological products.  By 
acknowledging the importance of intellectual property rights and the goal of equitably sharing the benefits 
derived from utilizing the genetic materials of developing countries, the CBD came close to striking a 
balance between the divergent views of the developed and developing world.  Nevertheless, the strong 
dissatisfaction of developed countries with the CBD’s protection of intellectual property rights 
strengthened the force of a second international agreement that many consider to be fundamentally at 
odds with the CBD: the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).   
 
V: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
 Against the backdrop of growing dissatisfaction with global regulation of intellectual property, 
industrialized countries pushed for a stronger uniform system of intellectual property rights.  Due in part 
to the pressures exerted by industrialized countries, a specific agreement on the availability and 
                                                 
78 Coughlin, supra note 68, at 348. 
79 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 32, art. 16.  See in particular Articles 16(3) and 16(5) for the 
intricate balance the CBD seeks to strike between the protection of intellectual property rights and the transfer of 
technology. 
80 MASKUS, supra note 20, at 225 (opines that the CBD is a “vague and confusing document with strictly exhortatory 
powers.”); see also Michael A. Gollin and Sarah A. Laird, Global Policies, Local Actions: The Role of National 
Legislation in Sustainable Biodiversity Prospecting, 2 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 16 (1996) (Stating that the CBD 
outlined a blue print for activity but failed to fully detail all necessary provisions).  
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enforcement of intellectual property rights became part of the final negotiations of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),81 the predecessor to the World Trade Organization (WTO).  The resulting 
agreement, known as the “TRIPS” agreement, represents the most comprehensive multilateral instrument 
on intellectual property rights.82   
 TRIPS encompasses a broad range of issues and goals, the breadth of which is beyond the scope 
of this article.  It was negotiated under the WTO and thus represents a binding commitment for all 
existing WTO members.83  TRIPS establishes minimum standards for systems of intellectual property 
rights protection for member countries.84  One of these standards requires members to award patents for 
any invention, including products and processes, in all fields of technology.85  To be eligible for a patent, 
the invention must involve “an inventive step” and have “industrial application.”86 Of particular relevance 
to biotechnology is the fact that TRIPS does not explicitly obligate members to patent plants and animals 
other than micro-organisms.87 However, Article 27(3) stipulates that should a member country opt not to 
provide patents for these genetic resources, the country must provide an “effective sui generis system.”88  
Thus, TRIPS does not excuse member states from providing protection to biotechnological products.   
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 Articles 66 and 67 address the obligations between developing and developed countries regarding 
technology transfer.  Article 66 imposes an obligation on developed countries to provide incentives for 
their enterprises and institutions to transfer technology to developing countries so that they may establish 
a sound technological base.89  Article 67 requires industrialized countries to cooperate in financial and 
technical matters, including assistance to developing countries in the implementation of the legal 
infrastructure for intellectual property rights protection.90  These provisions thus commit industrialized 
countries to use best efforts in identifying measures to encourage technology transfer and to promote the 
building of technological capacities of other members, especially the least-developed countries.91 
 Despite the obligations of developed countries to aid in the transfer of technology to developing 
countries, these efforts have largely amounted to nil.92  As a result, many countries expressed concern that 
industrialized countries and biotechnological corporations do not intend to use TRIPS in a manner that 
facilitates the stated objectives of the agreement.  In particular, concerns that intellectual property rights 
could be used to support highly restrictive licensing arrangements for important public-health products, 
such as pharmaceuticals, have raised the ire of countless member countries.93  This argument gains some 
legitimacy when one considers that the cost of acquiring drugs in many developing countries increased 
after the TRIPS Agreement took force in 1995.94   
 Despite many countries’ reservations over TRIPS, the past decade witnessed a strengthening of 
intellectual property rights legislation in developing countries.  Although dissent over the role of 
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intellectual property rights continues, strengthened intellectual property regimes appear to be the wave of 
the future, due in part to national commitments under TRIPS.95  Some attribute this trend to external 
pressures from the United States and the European Union to force intellectual property legislation in other 
member states.96  In some instances, developing countries were admonished to strengthen their 
intellectual property rights in complying with TRIPS under threat of trade sanctions.97   
 The impact of strengthened intellectual property rights systems in developing countries varies 
considerably.  Several countries experienced increases in foreign direct investment (FDI).  For example, 
after implementing strong intellectual property legislation in Singapore, many foreign computer 
companies that once refused to conduct business entered into joint ventures with domestic companies.98  
However, strengthened intellectual property rights did not lead to increased FDI in other developing 
countries adopting similar legislation, including many countries in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan 
Africa.99  The correlation between patents and inward FDI is positive in the larger, more advanced 
developing countries, but not in the least-developed countries.100  Consequently, strengthened intellectual 
property rights regimes in developing countries have led to skewed results in attracting FDI.   
 The varied impacts of strengthened intellectual property rights on FDI undoubtedly have an 
influence on the transfer of technology and the capacity of developing countries to cultivate 
biotechnological development domestically.  Jean Raymond Homere posits that strong intellectual 
property rights under the TRIPS Agreement are capable of stimulating domestic innovation and inducing 
greater research in developing countries.101  Intellectual property rights also provide incentives for 
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domestic firms to innovate, knowing their investments in research will be adequately protected.102  In the 
case of Brazil, Homere’s hypothesis is supported where unprotected biotechnological products 
discouraged foreign investment.103   
 Despite optimistic predictions that TRIPS would lead to increased technological transfer and 
economic stimulation in developing countries, experience has shown that TRIPS tends to promote the 
importation of biotechnological products, not processes, into developing countries.  Large pharmaceutical 
corporations from developed countries often apply for patents in developing countries but will not 
physically establish production facilities or research labs inside host countries.104  Patented products, not 
the technology needed to create them, tend to be transferred, thus defeating the capacity-building goals of 
Article 66.105  Many large biotechnological firms expressly precondition granting patent licenses on a host 
country’s promise not to establish research facilities domestically.106  While these business practices may 
provide limited protection to large biotechnology firms, they inhibit the overall transfer of scientific 
knowledge and technology envisioned under Articles 66 and 67.  Many agreements between foreign 
biotechnological firms and host countries charge excessive royalties or force developing countries’ firms 
to purchase inputs from the patent holder exclusively.107  This likewise imposes additional costs on the 
developing world that may inhibit local development and increase prices of crucial biotechnological 
products, such as pharmaceuticals and certain crops.108     
 Of particular relevance in discussing the impact of TRIPS compliance on developing countries is 
Article 34.  Under Article 34, if a patent protects a production process, a country developing a process for 
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the same product has the burden of proving that the two processes are different.109  Consequently, if a 
firm in a developing country seeks to develop a more efficient or innovative process for producing a 
biotechnological drug, for example, the entrant must prove the new process is truly unique and an 
inventive step.  This process can be expensive and burdensome for many small firms in developing 
countries, thus inhibiting them from entering the market and inventing new production processes.  
Furthermore, many large technological corporations require licensees of patented processes to grant 
patent rights on any further technological developments produced by the licensee back to the company.  
Consequently, many small firms in developing countries have little incentive to innovate, knowing that 
the fruits of their research will be granted back to the biotechnological corporation in the developed 
world.110 
 Not surprisingly, many developing countries remain reluctant to strengthen their intellectual 
property rights protections for a variety of reasons.  First, increased prices for life-saving pharmaceuticals 
and other products have prompted many countries to thwart the patent provisions of the United States and 
the European Union by producing essential medicines locally.111  For instance, in Argentina, domestic 
drug manufacturers often market generic drugs domestically at prices 15%-80% lower than the global 
market price.112  Moreover, TRIPS-compliance often imposes huge burdens on developing economies.  
To comply formally with the TRIPS Agreement, countries must establish industrial property registries, 
develop enforcement mechanisms, combat piracy, and prosecute criminals.113  Recent statistics provided 
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimate the costs of 
complying with TRIPS in various countries.114  In Bangladesh, for example, the fixed cost of establishing 
a TRIPS-compliant administration for intellectual property rights is estimated at $250,000, with annual 
costs for judicial work, equipment, and enforcement estimated at $1.1 million. These costs do not include 
                                                 
109 Ritche, supra note 93, at 438-40.   
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 441-42.   
112 Id. 
113 Visser, supra note 89, at 208.  
114 MASKUS, supra note 20, at 173-74. 
 19 
the costs of training. 115  While these statistics may not appear substantial, to many developing countries 
with limited budgets, TRIPS-compliance is an expensive proposition.  
 In sum, the TRIPS Agreement made many promises for facilitating the equitable transfer of 
technology to developing countries.  Although strengthened intellectual property protection enabled a 
handful of developing countries to obtain greater FDI than before the TRIPS Agreement, the overall 
impact of TRIPS on technology transfer has been dismal.  Despite the predictions of many economists 
and scholars alike that increased intellectual property protection will result in technological development 
both domestically and abroad, the fruits of this transfer have yet to provide any substantial gains for most 
developing countries.  Consequently, the net effect of Articles 66 and 67 has resulted in little effective 
technology transfer and benefits-sharing to developing countries.116   
 
VI: Proposals for Facilitating Technology Transfer and Benefits-Sharing 
 
 Although the CBD and TRIPS have admirable goals, both fail to achieve an equitable balance 
between the interests of industrialized and developing countries.  To foster the global exchange of genetic 
resources, technology, and indigenous knowledge on fair and equitable terms, a host of different 
strategies and reforms may be considered.  The following section presents various proposals and 
strategies for fostering these objectives.  For convenience, these strategies are subdivided into benefits-
sharing and technology-transfer strategies. Benefits-sharing strategies include (1) the utilization of Plant 
Breeders’ Rights and geographic indicators to protect plant varieties in host countries, (2) the creation of a 
centralized financial mechanism to aid developing countries in developing and implementing Plant 
Breeders’ Rights and geographic indicators, (3) unilateral amendments to expand the scope of geographic 
indicators under the TRIPS Agreement, and (4) employing trade secrets to protect the indigenous 
knowledge used in creating specialized plant varieties through traditional cross-breeding.  Technology-
transfer strategies include (1) material transfer agreements between suppliers and users of genetic 
                                                 
115 Id. These estimates also predict that Chile will spend approximately $718,000 in additional fixed costs with 
annual recurrent costs of $837,000.  An expert in Egypt recently estimated one-time fixed costs to be approximately 
$800,000, with additional training costs of $1 million per year. 
116 Id. at 239. 
 20 
resources, (2) regional and national legislative initiatives controlling the terms on which bio-prospecting 
may be conducted, and (3) disclosure requirements for patent applications in industrialized countries.  
A. Initiatives for the Sharing of Benefits on Fair and Equitable Terms 
 The utilization of intellectual property rights as a means of promoting the fair and equitable 
exchange of genetic resources promises to be a major challenge in coming years.  While many developing 
countries argue that intellectual property rights hinder benefits-sharing by providing monopolies for 
multinational corporations, international intellectual property rights systems are unlikely to disappear in 
the near future.  Some scholars have argued that with the correct approach, intellectual property rights 
could act as a tool for protecting the interests of indigenous communities in host countries.117   
Consequently, new approaches adapting intellectual property regimes to the interests of developing 
countries are indispensable. 
 The success or failure of an international intellectual property rights system that takes into 
account the interests of both the users and providers of genetic material depends on appropriate 
governmental initiatives.  One strategy for promoting the equitable sharing of benefits utilizes the existing 
intellectual property laws shared by many industrialized countries.  The key to this strategy is to find a 
means to make the genetic constitution of plants and fungi eligible for intellectual property protections 
currently recognized by parties to the TRIPS Agreement.  By utilizing existing intellectual property laws, 
this approach would not entail ground-breaking legislative reforms, nor would the economic feasibility of 
these reforms deter countries from implementing this strategy.   
 If the genetic inputs of biotechnology are to be eligible for intellectual property rights protection, 
a distinction must be made between phenotypes and genotypes.  A phenotype refers to the outward 
physical manifestation of an organism, including its parts, cells, structures, tissues.118  The concept of 
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phenotypes can be analogized to the legal concept of chattels in that it refers to a definitive structural 
object.119 A genotype refers to the internal code of inheritable information carried by living organisms.120 
Organisms thus have dual capacities as both chattels and carriers of genetic information.121  
 The current controversy surrounding the protection of genetic resources focuses not on the value 
of living organisms as chattels, but as a source of genetic information.122  In general, phenotypes are 
ineligible for intellectual property protection under the existing laws of most states, while genotypes are 
amenable to various forms of proprietary protection.123  This distinction thus separates claims to valuable 
genetic information from claims to the chattel to which this information is embedded.124  An appropriate 
analogy is found in property rights protection for music records. While a person can have a proprietary 
claim over a particular record, its purchase or sale does not transfer the copyrighted information contained 
within the record.125  
 The patentability of genotypes in their natural state does not typically fall under the purview of 
most countries’ existing intellectual property laws or under TRIPS.  However, indigenous communities 
and traditional farmers in host countries often manipulate plant varieties to produce traits distinct from 
their natural form.  Consequently, a variety of intellectual property rights other than patents or copyrights 
could provide a viable means to protect these countries’ interests in their biodiversity.  An effective 
national strategy should provide a channel for recognizing and enforcing intellectual property rights 
protection for specific genotypes of plants bred by indigenous communities.   
Long before the advent of modern genetic engineering and biotechnology, indigenous 
communities and traditional farmers began crop experimentation using conventional cross-breeding or 
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open-pollination methods.126  These conventional methods produced unique varieties of plants and 
agricultural crops that continue to be developed in the modern era.  As an illustration, Andean potato 
farmers developed through traditional farming a variety of frost-resistant crops for growing in flatlands 
where frost was common.127  The genotypes of these plants are often the product of indigenous knowledge 
handed down over generations.  Both the genotype and the indigenous knowledge that produced the plant 
variety may be eligible for certain types of intellectual property protection. 
One strategy for protecting the interests of host countries is to provide Plant Breeder’s Rights 
(PBR) protection for unique crop varieties.  PBRs are a patent-like system for cultivated plants developed 
under the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).128  PBRs give the 
breeder exclusive rights to produce, sell, and import seed varieties.129  Instead of the traditional criteria for 
patent eligibility, PBRs use (1) distinctiveness, (2) uniformity, and (3) stability.  Stability and uniformity 
are measures of reproducibility among successive generations of specimens.  Distinctiveness is the more 
critical test and requires that the plant variety be clearly distinguishable from all known varieties.130   
Under the revised standards of UPOV, a plant variety determined to be “dependent” on an initial 
variety protected by PBR cannot be commercialized without the prior consent or permission of the PBR 
owner.131  Dependency is found where the plant variety at issue is “predominantly derived” from the 
initial variety.  Derivation can be determined through specifically identified procedures, such as genetic 
transformation or cross-breeding.132  Under Article 27, TRIPS mandates that member countries provide 
either patents or a sui generis system, such as PBRs.  Consequently, this form of intellectual property 
right could provide a means for local communities to obtain some control and remuneration for their 
unique plant varieties. 
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Empirical data on the impact of PBRs is largely unavailable.  However, Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay have adopted PBR systems that have greatly benefited private farmers.133  In these Latin 
American economies, PBRs have improved the ability of private breeders to control local seed markets 
and prevent unauthorized trade.  Moreover, these countries have witnesses increased accessibility to 
foreign seed as a result of PBRs, since foreign plant breeders are more willing to market their products in 
these countries.134 
Although PBRs have the potential to provide an effective means to protect unique plant varieties 
developed by traditional farmers in host countries, PBRs have historically been utilized by large 
commercial plant breeders in developed countries.135  Much like patents, traditional farmers in host 
countries often find it difficult to obtain protection under PBRs.  The criteria of stability and uniformity 
are often traits bred by large agribusiness, while traditional farmers typically breed crops for 
adaptability.136  Thus, PBRs do not always lend themselves to developing countries.   A second drawback 
of PBRs is that they still permit others to utilize the genotype of a protected variety for private use, thus 
limiting the ability of PBRs to provide the same level of protection or potential remuneration as patents.137  
Finally, PBRs are not uniformly recognized around the globe, since only a handful of states belong to 
UPOV.138 
To obtain the advantages of PBRs and less of the drawbacks, Article 27 of TRIPS theoretically 
provides developing countries the flexibility to implement a sui generis system of intellectual property 
rights.139  Countries such as India, Thailand, and Columbia have already begun devising intellectual 
property systems that are friendlier to traditional farmers.140 Developing countries could also create a 
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form of intellectual property rights that restrict the granting of private uses for genotypes so as to better 
protect their unique plant varieties.   
In order to assist developing countries facing the enormous cost of devising an effective PBR 
system or a sui generis functional equivalent, a funding mechanism could help subsidize the 
establishment of infrastructures for developing, implementing, and enforcing these intellectual property 
systems.141  These funds could be partially derived out of the profits earned from their own genetic 
resources.  This approach would simultaneously promote benefits-sharing and strengthen intellectual 
property rights, as required under TRIPS.  In addition, the CBD’s funding mechanism, the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), could be employed if further financial assistance is needed.142  Joint 
collaboration with the CBD would likely have the added benefit of increasing the political legitimacy of 
the CBD, promoting good-will between the developed and developing countries, and allaying the fears of 
the United States and other industrialized countries that the CBD does not provide adequate intellectual 
property rights protections.   
TRIPS also contemplates utilizing geographic indicators as a means of protecting the intellectual 
property of member states.  Geographic indicators are defined under Article 22 as “indications which 
identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a 
given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical 
origin.”143  Article 22 mandates that members must prohibit the registration of a good that misrepresents 
its geographical origin.  Article 23 provides additional protection for wines and spirits, reflecting the 
relatively narrow scope of geographic indicators under the TRIPS Agreement.  The special protection 
provided for wines and spirits—largely a luxury good—provoked criticism that many of the TRIPS 
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provisions were devised without adequate consideration of the interests of developing countries.144  
Indeed, geographic indicators are largely confined to limited applications under TRIPS.145 
Geographic indicators are akin to trademarks in that they are not intended to reward innovation.146  
Instead, geographic indicators reward members of an established community for adhering to traditional 
communal or cultural practices.  Throughout the globe, geographic indicators have been recognized in 
wines as well as certain food products produced in France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal.147  These 
intellectual property rights thus have the potential to create economic rewards for producers who utilize 
indigenous knowledge in the production of their products.   
Some developing countries have recognized the potential benefits of utilizing geographic 
indicators as a means to protect native products otherwise ineligible for patent protection.  Developing 
countries have pressed for the inclusion of certain food products, such as Basmati rice or Darjeeling tea, 
under Article 22 of TRIPS.148 If these countries’ efforts prove successful, geographic indicators could 
provide protection against unauthorized commercial exploitation of a wide array of products.  For 
example, a broadened scope of geographic indicators under TRIPS could provide a means for certain 
varieties of traditionally bred plants to obtain protection that might otherwise be unavailable.  However, 
in a recent press release, the United States is resisting efforts by the European Union to add geographic 
indicators protections for products other than wine and spirits.149  The United States is taking the position 
that the costs of expanding the scope of geographic indicators would far outweigh the benefits, especially 
for developing countries.150  
The concerns of the United States are an ironic development in light of its traditional stance 
favoring strengthened intellectual property rights protection.  Nevertheless, its position highlights a 
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legitimate logistical concern over the expansion of intellectual property rights in developing countries.  
For geographic indicators to properly function, countries must be able to develop appropriate legal 
structures to register traditional cultural practices and determine if they qualify for protection.  These legal 
structures may require appropriate capacity-building in terms of training, education, and domestic 
legislation.  An international registry for all members of the CBD and TRIPS could provide a solution 
that would alleviate some of the financial and logistical burdens on developing countries.  The WTO or 
the CBD Secretariat could potentially coordinate these registry systems.  A central registry would also 
facilitate the sharing of information between countries while protecting developing countries’ rights to 
ensure that the original suppliers of genetically-derived domestic products produced through traditional 
methods are remunerated. 
In addition to plant varieties, indigenous knowledge may likewise be eligible for intellectual 
property protection if appropriate national legislation is adopted.  One potential method of providing 
indigenous knowledge adequate intellectual property protection is through trade secrets.  Trade secrets 
may consist of patterns or compilations of information used in one’s business which give the holder a 
competitive advantage over those without the same knowledge.151  Trade secrets may also include 
chemical formulas, a process of manufacturing, treating, or preserving materials, and patterns for 
machines.152  The object of trade secrets is to prevent undisclosed, commercially valuable information 
from being acquired or used by others without the consent of the property right holder.153   
If benefits-sharing is to be promoted through trade secrets, the persons who stand to benefit must 
recognize the commercial value of their indigenous knowledge.  The awareness of the rights and potential 
benefits of trade secret protection is crucial.154  Once acknowledged, trade secrets can be protected by 
agreements among indigenous populations to protect these types of property.  Domestic governments may 
aid in this endeavor by assisting local communities in recognizing the value of trade secret protections 
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and enforcing infringements.  This strategy would thus require many developing countries to strengthen 
their existing intellectual property legislation and enforcement capacities.   
Indigenous communities in developing countries have tried to use trade secrets to protect 
communal knowledge that had been passed down through several generations.  For example, a small tribe 
in Peru sought to protect its genetic resources and communal traditions from unauthorized 
expropriation.155  Shaman Pharmaceuticals, a United States corporation, attempted to obtain information 
and materials from the tribe that could be useful in the development of plant-derived medicines.  The tribe 
demanded that Shaman enter into a contractual agreement with them to ensure that the tribe obtained 
benefits from the expropriation.  Although the corporation did not share the rights to co-ownership of any 
patents or proceeds from any commercial product derived through the tribe’s assistance, Shaman agreed 
to pay royalty payments if a product was placed on the market and to provide aid to the tribe in the form 
of public health assistance and forest conservation efforts.156 
Through trade secrets or a sui generis equivalent, savvy indigenous communities, such as the 
tribe in Peru, can utilize intellectual property protections to share in the benefits of their genetic resources.  
However, even when trade secrets or a sui generis system are adopted, the country or tribe must anticipate 
challenges to their property rights.  Were a dispute to arise over the unauthorized utilization of a trade 
secret, governments of developing countries could enforce these rights directly or refuse to deal with the 
violator in the future.  As always, necessary financial and legal mechanisms may be necessary to aid 
developing countries in strengthening the skills and facilities to process, register, or enforce these rights.  
Moreover, a potential drawback of trade secrets is that they do not protect fair and independent 
discoveries of the same product or process.157  Enforcement mechanisms may therefore prove tricky and 
burdensome for many of the least-developed countries.  Countries trading in biotechnological resources 
should look into strategies that could coordinate the efforts of NGOs or provide a centralized mechanism 
that could aid in dispute settlements.   
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The right combination of intellectual property rights and private agreements may provide 
developing countries greater leverage in protecting rights to their resources while facilitating the sharing 
of benefits on fair and equitable terms.  PBRs and geographic indicators provide potential intellectual 
property alternatives to patents by protecting the genotypes of plants and the indigenous knowledge that 
developed them.  Nevertheless, using geographic indicators under TRIPS would require an expansion of 
Article 22 that encompasses certain plant varieties meeting the established criteria.  Finally, the use of 
trade secrets as a means for protecting indigenous knowledge should be explored by those countries 
providing the genetic resources for foreign biotechnological companies.   
B. Initiatives for Technology Transfer 
 Despite the poor track record of license and process agreements, other bilateral agreements 
between multinational corporations and host countries have shown promise for facilitating the technology 
transfer goals of the CBD and the TRIPS Agreement.  Additional efforts on the part of both 
biotechnological corporations and host countries should be employed in facilitating the transfer of 
technology to developing countries through such private arrangements.  These agreements could also 
provide a means to enjoin foreign firms from requiring developing countries to grant all subsequent 
innovations derived from a product or process back to the foreign firm.   
 Private agreements designed specifically to address access to the genetic resources of a host 
country are often referred to as “material transfer agreements” (MTAs).158  These agreements apply when 
the owners of the materials/host countries are identifiable and are willing to grant permission to use the 
genetic material or indigenous knowledge to a foreign buyer.159  One of the most publicized MTAs was 
the agreement between Merck Pharmaceuticals, among the largest pharmaceutical corporations in the 
world, and Costa Rica’s Institutio Nacional de Biodiversidad (InBio), a non-profit organization granted 
authority by the Costa Rican government to use national parks and conservation areas in efforts to 
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facilitate sustainable development.160  In this agreement, InBio agreed to provide approximately 2,000 
samples of various genetic materials to Merck over a two-year period.161  Merck paid InBio $1,135,000, 
which was to be used in taxonomic activities, genetic resource conservation, scientific training, and 
acquiring equipment for specimen collection.  If Merck was able to successfully commercialize a product 
derived from Costa Rica’s natural resources, Merck agreed to make royalty payments.  Finally, the 
agreement also provided that Merck would employ local scientists for its bio-prospecting.162   
 This agreement thus met several objectives of both the CBD and TRIPS.  First, by providing up-
front remuneration to InBio and the Costa Rican government, the host country shares a stake in 
innovations developed out of their biological resources.  Second, by including a provision whereby Merck 
would provide royalty payments for any future commercialized product, the host country shares in the 
benefits of any profits derived through biotechnological development.  Third, the agreement facilitated 
technology transfer by employing local scientists in bio-prospecting.   
 The Merck-InBio agreement marked an important development in the global exchange of genetic 
resources and biotechnology.  Nevertheless, the agreement has also been criticized on a number of fronts.  
Such an agreement would be inapplicable to a majority of developing countries because few possess 
institutions such as InBio that oversee the country’s natural resources.  Moreover, agreements of this type 
would have limited applicability to countries populated by indigenous communities that should, in all 
fairness, share in any benefits derived from their knowledge. This quandary presents a formidable 
problem for MTAs, as these agreements may provide remuneration to developing countries’ governments 
without compensating the indigenous tribe that originally supplied the materials and information used in 
developing the product.   
 Shaman Pharmaceuticals, the corporation that entered into an agreement with tribes in Peru, 
utilized an innovative approach towards bio-prospecting that provides insight into how contracts can 
facilitate technology transfer.  Shaman developed a program to compensate communities that assist in 
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identifying and retrieving genetic materials that could be used in developing new pharmaceuticals.163  
This program paid indigenous communities royalties on any successful commercial products derived from 
their resources.  However, because the likelihood of a particular genetic resource having a commercial 
application is approximately 1 in 10,000, 164 Shaman also provided short- and medium-term benefits to 
address the immediate needs of the indigenous community.165  These benefits included training local 
scientists in using new technologies, providing scientific software, and supplying certain biotechnological 
equipment.166   Finally, Shaman established the Healing Forest Conservancy, a non-profit institution 
which distributes the profits from commercial products among the regional communities from which the 
commercialized product was sourced.167   
 Shaman’s program created considerable excitement and speculation about the efficacy of private 
agreements in facilitating the transfer of technology to indigenous communities.  However, Shaman faced 
substantial financial hurdles in implementing this program.168  In 1994, Eli Lilly, Shaman’s primary 
source of research funds, did not renew its research contract.169  Moreover, Shaman was unable to turn a 
profit by the time Eli Lilly withdrew.170  The financial troubles of Shaman eventually led the company to 
withdraw from bio-prospecting altogether.171  Shaman’s demise as a leader in providing technology 
transfer and benefits-sharing for indigenous communities thus calls into question the efficacy of these 
programs as a viable business model.  Nevertheless, Shaman’s bio-prospecting activities illustrate the 
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potential of private contractual agreements between biotechnology corporations and indigenous 
communities to facilitate technology transfer to the developing world. 
 In addition to MTAs, national and regional initiatives aimed at facilitating technology transfer 
constitute another option that countries should explore in achieving the aims of the CBD and TRIPS.  In 
1996, the Andean Pact, consisting of Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, adopted the 
“Common System on Access to Genetic Resources” (Access System) to consolidate and develop 
domestic technological and scientific capabilities.172  Under this system, a centralized national authority is 
designated by each member country to provide genetic resources, inspect or sign access contracts, carry 
out the decisions of the Pact, and ensure compliance by foreign bio-prospectors.  The Access System 
requires potential bio-prospectors to obtain the prior informed consent of these national institutions in 
order to gain access to the host country’s resources.  Non-compliance with these access regulations gives 
rise to possible cancellation of intellectual property rights conferred to foreign bio-prospectors.  Finally, 
the Access System requires the national legislatures of each member country to adopt appropriate 
secondary laws to comply with these obligations.   
 The Andean Pact’s Access System represents the most formal arrangement for recording 
contributions to inventions and controlling access to genetic resources in the developing world.173  Prior 
to the approval of this system, such access was unrestricted.174  Member countries could not obtain their 
fair share of resulting economic benefits.  The Access System sought to enable member countries to 
obtain benefits from biotechnological products derived from their resources by facilitating technological 
training, research, development, and transfers through state access contracts.175   
 The Access System is still in its infancy and has yet to offer the results necessary to analyze its 
successes or failures.  Progress has been made in each member state, although the system is undergoing a 
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review process focusing on practical implementation problems.176  Notably, one of the main problems of 
implementation is the high cost of operation.177  Consequently, an equivalent system might not be a viable 
option in the least-developed countries that lack the funds or trained personnel necessary to manage such 
a complex infrastructure.  Despite this drawback, however, the Access System could be a useful tool for 
governing access to the genetic resources of host countries and providing a legislative mechanism for the 
transfer of technologies to the developing world. 
 Problems with the Access System could arise if foreign bio-prospectors from industrialized 
countries are able to circumvent the system by failing to meet the prior informed consent and contract 
requirements of each nation.  Although the Access System contains a provision providing for the 
revocation of any intellectual property rights granted to a foreign bio-prospector in their own territory, 
illicit bio-prospectors can still obtain a patent in their home countries.  One example is the case of the 
neem tree, which traditionally has been used as a pesticide in India.178  W.R. Grace, a United States 
corporation, obtained a United States patent on pesticides derived from the tree.  Activists protested, 
claiming that the tree had been used as a pesticide for generations.  The United States Patent Office was 
statutorily prohibited from considering foreign public knowledge as part of the patent application and was 
thus unable to revoke the patent.179  As a result of this problem, scholars have proposed a variety of 
disclosure systems whereby the grant of a patent application requires the prior informed consent of the 
nation of origin.180  
 Through the use of private contract agreements and legislative initiatives, the transfer of 
technology to developing countries and indigenous communities could be accomplished on mutually 
agreed terms.  The material transfer agreements utilized by Merck and Shaman illustrate methods that 
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host countries can employ to facilitate access to genetic resources while determining the terms of the 
transaction.  These terms may include obligations by foreign biotechnology corporations to train domestic 
scientists, transfer biotechnological equipment, and employ local biologists in prospecting activities.  
National and regional initiatives such as the Andean Pact likewise provide a means for host countries to 
dictate the terms of trade by conditioning access on state contractual agreements.  Much like material 
transfer agreements, legislative initiatives represent another tool that can be used to set the terms of trade 
and foster the objectives of technology transfer under the CBD and TRIPS.  In the coming years, the 
appropriate combination of these strategies could prove to be a potent combination for countries to 
increase their bargaining power.  
 
 
Conclusion: 
The biotechnology industry has fundamentally altered the economic potential of genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge found in developing countries.  Pharmaceutical corporations and Agribusiness 
increasingly rely upon these resources to engineer new drugs and genetically modified crops for sale in 
the international market.  Developing countries, home to over eighty percent of the world’s 
biodiversity,181  have become hotbeds for bio-prospectors searching for the next big breakthrough in 
medicine or agriculture. As a result of the high stakes involved in this multi-billion dollar industry, the 
global community, in seeking to facilitate the equitable sharing of benefits, is struggling to strike a 
balance between the interests of biological suppliers and biotechnological inventors. 
The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights mirror the conflicting views of industrialized and developing countries 
concerning intellectual property rights.  Industrialized countries view the CBD with a suspicious eye, as it 
precariously balances the sovereign rights of states with intellectual property protections.  In turn, 
developing countries often viewed TRIPS as a tool for affording multinational corporations access to their 
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resources without sharing in the benefits derived from them.  Despite these differences, both the CBD and 
TRIPS utilize benefits-sharing, technology transfer, and intellectual property rights protection as methods 
of promoting the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from biotechnology. 
 Benefits-sharing and technology transfer remain lofty goals under the CBD and TRIPS.  
Nevertheless, a number of strategies and proposals should be considered to achieve these ends.  Through 
the use of Plant Breeders’ Rights and geographic indicators, developing countries can obtain benefits for 
plant varieties developed through traditional knowledge.  Trade secrets could be employed to protect the 
indigenous knowledge sought by biotechnological corporations.  The use of contracts between suppliers 
and users of genetic resources would facilitate technology transfer to host countries.  These agreements 
could also be a component in legislative and regional initiatives designed to control access to genetic 
resources and encourage the transfer of technology from foreign bio-prospectors.  Finally, developed 
countries should consider proposals to include a disclosure requirement in patent applications to prevent 
unauthorized use of genetic materials.   
   The global community is just beginning the process of reconciling the application of intellectual 
property rights to genetic resources and traditional knowledge.  In their efforts to forge a path to a 
solution, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights often cross paths in areas of great controversy.  Despite these tensions, both 
treaties ultimately foster economic development through recognition of the role intellectual property 
rights play in protecting the interests of users and consumers of genetic resources.  Through a studied 
application of new and existing forms of intellectual property rights, biotechnology may someday make 
all countries winners in the eyes of the global economy. 
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